These are not my words, but those of Akiskal and McKinney', and they were written over ten years ago. Little seems to have changed in the meantime. Their suggestion that clinical, psychological, genetic, biochemical and neurophysiological data could and should be integrated has not, in general, been followed. Fortunately there are some exceptions to this general lack of interest concerning the integration of scientific findings, and the contributions of Professors Gray and Marks provide outstanding examples. It is difficult to think of many others in the field of anxiety, and this lack is equally apparent in the case of depression. Research papers tend to be concerned with either biological, psychological or social theories of aetiology; few, if any, look at interactions between these factors, let alone attempt an integration. One sad consequence of this exclusive approach to aetiological theory is that treatments of mood disorders tend to be likewise segregated. Clearly this does not follow logically: a belief in the biological aetiology of mood disorders does not preclude effective psychological treatment, nor vice versa. Nonetheless, published trials tend to evaluate drugs, or psychological treatments, but rarely consider ways in which they may interact. In this paper I shall spend a little time considering interactions of the other sortthose concerned with aetiology. Since Akiskal and McKinney's 1973 paper', one further approach has been added to their list of rival theories that may account for depression: the cognitive or information-processing model. Because this is a relatively new approach, and one that is currently attracting a great deal of research, the cognitive model forms the focus of this presentation. One problem of doing this is that I am committing the very sin of which I am accusing othersthat of narrowly focusing on one aspect of a research discipline, rather than integrating across disciplines. Let me therefore hasten to add that this new data is offered together with the suggestion that it may eventually be incorporated into an integrated theory. In view of this hope I will turn later to an attempt at relating these cognitive findings to biological and pharmacological approaches to treatment.
Memory bias in depression
Depression is associated with a number of cognitive characteristics; for example, a tendency to perceive oneself as hopeless and helpless. One method of qualifying these so-called cognitive distortions is by questionnaire. The Dysfunctional Attitude Questionnaire, for example, is used to assess the extent to which patients endorse extremely negative views of themselves, the world, and the future. As will be seen later, these self-report measures of cognitive processes have been used to assess the effects of cognitive therapy. Most experimental psychologists, however, believe that much of the informationprocessing activity in the brain cannot be directly reported since it is not consciously accessible.
For this reason, a number of new experimental techniques have been developed to assess cognitive processes more objectively. Using these techniques, depressed patients have been found to exhibit a consistent negative bias in memory favouring negative material about themselves. For example, the more depressed patients are, the slower they are to recall happy personal memories and, to a lesser extent, the faster they are to recall unhappy memories. This can be shown by providing a neutral cue word, such as 'journey' and measuring the time taken to produce a memory concerning a journey that is either positive or negative in content2.
Furthermore, if a list of positive and negative words, such as 'generous' and 'selfish', etc., are presented in the guise of a rating task, on later memory testing depressed patients recall more negative than positive words in comparison with non-depressed subjects. The clinical significance of such findings is that this negative distortion may be both a cause and an effect of depression; that is, depression may cause a negative recall bias, but this bias will then ensure that patients spend their time thinking about unhappy and depressing things3.
The cognitive process involved is in fact rather more specific than would be implied by talking about a general negative bias. Rather, the negative bias relates only to material that has been encoded in relation to oneself. To illustrate this, consider the following experiment4 in which the same negative and positive words were presented to depressed patients and to non-depressed controls, in the context of a simple rating task. In some instances subjects were asked to decide whether the word applied to themselves, and in other instances whether the word applied to someone else, such as a passing acquaintance. After the rating task, subjects were asked to recall as many words as they could. Only when the words were rated for themselves did the depressed patients show the negative bias; when words were rated for others, depressed patients showed the same positive recall bias as did normals.
Such a specific effect is striking, and makes simple explanations in terms of general changes in brain chemistry seem problematic. At the very least one has to think in terms of an interaction between such biological vulnerability factors and the way in which people learn to organize positive and negative information in memory. Such a position is of course not at all incompatible with the role of negative life events in leading to depression. One could easily suppose that life events interact with biological vulnerability to create or expand depressogenic memory structures, which serve to maintain disturbed mood via the negative bias in recall. Like Akiskal and McKinney', I believe that depression has a final common pathway involving a dysfunction in the brain mechanisms concerned with reinforcement and punishment. At the same time I believe that the negative bias in recall plays a part in maintaining this dysfunction.
Obviously it is equally possible to argue that the cognitive effects we have observed are simply secondary consequences of depressed mood, rather than the manifestation of relatively permanent structures in memory. At present it is impossible to know whether the negative bias is cause or consequence, since this will require prospective studies to test whether depression-prone individuals show the effect before the disorder begins. In the meantime we have started to test recovered depressives to see if any of the cognitive effects outlast the clinical state. Self-report measures, such as the Dysfunctional Attitude Questionnaire mentioned earlier, appear to revert to normality on recovery. The memory bias effects, on the other hand, may not do so.
In a group of clinically recovered depressives, we found that the negative bias in memory persists in comparison with those recovered from anxiety or normal controls. Although this preliminary finding may not hold up when longer periods of recovery are involved, it is consistent with relatively permanent cognitive differences between individuals who are or are not vulnerable to depression. If this is found to be true, then cognitive differences between individuals may be one of the factors that determine whether or not life events such as loss are interpreted in a depressogenic way.
Negative bias in subjective risk estimation Apart from a negative view of themselves, depressed patients are also said to have a negative view of the future. In normals, cognitive research has revealed a link between ease of retrieval from memory and the perceived risk of future events, whether pleasant or unpleasant. That is, people judge a future event as more or less likely according to whether similar or related events can be easily recalled from memory. If the vivid memory or image of an accident can easily be recalled, then future accidents tend to be judged as more probable, regardless of the true objective probability. For this reason it might be expected that depression would also be associated with a decreased expectation of future positive events, and an increased subjective probability of future negative events. When we asked depressed, anxious or normal individuals to estimate the probability of hypothetical events (such as winning a lottery, or having an accident), this prediction was found to be accurate5. Although the apparent differences for positive events were in the expected direction, they were not significant. However, both depressed and anxious patients significantly overestimated the probability of future negative events in comparison to normal controls. Even more interesting was the tendency in patients for estimates of event likelihood to vary according to whether ratings were for themselves or for others. Both anxious and depressed patients tend to see negative events as more likely to happen to themselves than they are to others.
Unexpectedly, however, when we investigated anxious patients looking for evidence of the negative bias in memory that occurs in depression, we could not find it: memory in anxious patients is the same as that of normal controls. If the inflation of subjective risk seen in anxiety does not derive from memory, how then does it arise? One possible mechanism is suggested by the fact that patients in anxiety states act in some ways as if the brain mechanisms involved in scanning the environment for danger have become overactive.
Perceptual bias in anxiety
We have investigated perceptual scanning for danger cues in a variety of cognitive experiments, of which only two will be mentioned. If anxious patients are required to perform a mental task, such as naming the colour in which words are printed, while at the same time ignoring the actual word content, they have greater difficulty in this task than do non-anxious subjects6. More interestingly, they are particularly slow if the words to be colour-named are related to threat. Normal controls colour-name words at about the same rate whether the words are related to threat or not. Anxious patients are not only particularly slow in the case of threat words, but their performance is even more disrupted if the threat words are related to topics that they report worrying about. One possible explanation of this effect is that attentional resources are siphoned off, as it were, by perception of the meaning of the threat word, leaving fewer processing resources available for the colour-naming task. Thus anxious patients act as if they are unable to avoid processing information related to danger, even when they are requested not to do so.
Furthermore, we believe that this selective processing of danger information is automatic, and may even be unavailable to conscious report. In another experiment7 we played similar threat or non-threat words through one (unattended) channel of a stereo tape-recorder, while subjects were required to listen to the other (attended) channel, and simultaneously to repeat what they heard. Anxious patients produced significantly more errors than controls in this task, and were also slower in a reaction time test performed at the same time. More importantly, although anxious patients never reported actually hearing the threat or non-threat words, their performance on the reaction time task was significantly worse when the unheard words were related to threat. We can be certain that the words were not consciously perceived, because no subject successfully identified them when a recognition test was given at the end of the experiment.
In other words, it seems that anxious patients allocate more processing resources to cues that are related to danger, even when they are completely unaware of this fact, and are unable to report on the nature of these cues. Needless to say, it is possible to speculate that such results explain why anxious patients may report sudden increases in anxiety without being able to report any environmental cause. Panic feelings that 'come out of the blue' may be one clinical example.
Clearly such danger-sensitive mechanisms could be described in neurophysiological terms, as for example in Professor Gray's model. Equally, one might see the overactivity of cognitive processes related to danger as resulting from exposure to threatening life events. Finlay-Jones and Brown8 have argued, for example, that anxiety is more likely to follow danger events, as depression is more likely to follow loss events.
As indicated earlier, these findings are not offered as part of a complete theory of mood disorders, but rather as examples of data that a complete theory must account for. In the same way, the apparent depletion of some neurotransmitters in depression needs to be accommodated in any aetiological theory, rather than providing a complete theory in itself. Presumably, both negative memory bias in depression, and the perceptual bias for danger cues in anxiety, relate to the brain processes that have become dysfunctional in mood disorders. If both psychological and biological markers reflect the same basic process, then presumably any effective treatment will change both simultaneously. To examine this question I will now turn to studies of cognitive and pharmacological therapy for depression, used separately and in combination.
Effects of cognitive and drug therapy in depression
Since the landmark paper by Rush and colleagues9, there have been two other controlled studies comparing tricyclic antidepressants with the method of cognitive therapy (CT) developed by Beck and his colleagues. Examination of these three papers, together with related research, may provide answers to questions about whether cognitive therapy and pharmacotherapy have different effects when used separately, and whether they interact when used in combination.
The first study by Rush et al.9 compared the two treatments separately with moderately depressed outpatients. Of 19 assigned to CT only one dropped out of treatment, while of 22 patients assigned to imipramine (with a maximum of 250mg daily), 8 dropped out. Considering only those who completed treatment, both methods produced marked improvement, and CT was significantly superior on analysis of both BDI and Hamilton rating scales for depression.
Although this striking result suggests that CT may actually be superior to drug treatment, several criticisms have been voiced since this report was published. For example, although assessors were independent in the sense they were not involved in treatment, they were not blind as to which treatment had been given. Drug treatment was restricted to imipramine, rather than being chosen for each patient. Furthermore, the dosage level was tapered off for the last two weeks coming up to posttreatment assessment. CT patients were seen more often than those receiving drugs, and finally, no evidence was offered to show that CT was specifically more effective in changing the cognitive processes that form its main target.
A more recent study by Blackburn and others'0 rectified some but not all of these problems. Hospital outpatients, or general practice patients, were separately assigned to drug treatment, CT, or to a combination of both. Clinicians responsible for each patient assigned to pharmacotherapy selected the antidepressant drug that they thought was most appropriate; this was usually amitriptyline or clomipramine 150 mg daily. Drug treatment was continued right through the trial and into follow up, so that patients were on the maximum dose at reassessment. Non-responders to any of the treatment conditions were withdrawn from the trial after 12 weeks.
Results differed somewhat according to location. In the hospital group there was no difference between CT and drug treatment, although there was a trend for the treatment combination group to do best. In the general practice group the response to CT and the combination treatment was similar; both were better than drug treatment alone. There were no obvious differences according to whether patients were classified as endogenous or not. Combining patients from both locations, 18 out of 22 were classified as responders to the combination treatment (i.e. more than 50% symptomatic improvement by 12 weeks), 16 out of 22 in CT, and 11 out of 20 in the drug group.
Although this result supports the claim made for CT by Rush et al.9 in the case of general practice patients, those treated at hospital did equally well with both treatments. Perhaps this suggests that cognitive therapy is better only with less severe patients, or perhaps that the compliance with medication was reduced in the general practice setting. Other interpretive problems remain: assessors in this study were also not fully blind, and the amount of therapist contact was greater in patients receiving CT so that some of the apparent benefit might be attributable to nonspecific therapeutic support.
In the most recent study by Murphy et al.", 87 moderately to severe depressed outpatients were assigned either to CT, or to nortriptyline, with dose determined by blood levels, and continued after reassessment. Two combination treatments were also studied, in the form of CT together with drug treatment, or with placebo. Assessors were blind only to the presence of drug or placebo. There were most treatment drop-outs in the drug alone group (8 out of 24), but this was not statistically significant. Analysis of BDI and Hamilton depression scores indicated no differences in treatment effectiveness, either at post-treatment or on one month follow up.
The similarity of treatment effects, not only at termination but also throughout treatment in this study, is striking. The difference between this and the finding by Rush et al. seems attributable to Murphy's CT patients doing slightly less well, and his drug patients slightly better than did those of Rush. These most recent results parallel those of the hospital group studied by Blackburn et al. Thus a reasonable conclusion would appear to be that, in general, CT is equivalent to drug treatment in its effects, although there may be some patients or treatment settings where CT is to be preferred, particularly given the higher drop-out rate from drug treatment. An important new finding is the close equivalence between the effects of either psychological or pharmacological treatment, and those of the treatments given in combination. Such a finding strongly argues that both methods are in some ways influencing the same basic process or mechanism, rather than each having unique effects or acting in a completely distinctive way. Such a conclusion, of course, has implications for the issue raised at the beginning of this paper; namely, that different aetiological theories may actually be describing similar processes in a different language.
Needless to say, other interpretations are possible. Perhaps CT does have unique effects on cognitive processes which are not shared by drug treatments. However, in the trial by Murphy et al." patients also completed the Dysfunctional Attitude Questionnaire before and after treatment, and all treatments produced very similar changes.
Other workers have also reported similar cognitive changes following drug treatment, and have argued that this proves that they must simply be symptoms rather than a causal factor in depression. Such an argument is of course illogical; effective treatment can and ideally should change causal or maintaining factors, even if the treatment operates through a different modality than the original cause. Clearly cognitive factors can profoundly influence depression, since otherwise treatments such as CT would not be as effective as they are.
Instead, I believe these results argue strongly for an interactive model of mood disorders. Whether the initial cause of depression is primarily biological, psychological or social, all three factors are probably involved. A useful model of how depression is maintained also requires interacting processes; depressed mood is associated with changes in neurotransmitter levels, in cognitive distortions and reduced social behaviour. Each ofthese may serve to maintain the others in circular fashion. If so, then treatment interventions that change any of the factors will also tend to change the others, and the end result will appear the same.
This does not mean that all the processes involved in CT and drug treatment must be identical. On the contrary, it seems likely that, if they interfere with the chain of causal influences maintaining depression at different points or stages, subtle differences in the pattern of improvement over time will be detectable. However, it is unlikely that this subtle type of specificity in the action of different treatments will be discovered using the rather crude measures currently available. Instead, I anticipate that the development of measures based on the experiments described earlier will eventually allow us to probe more deeply into these questions.
